Many large-scale information systems such as intelligent transportation systems, smart grids or smart buildings collect data about the activities of their users to optimize their operations. To encourage participation and adoption of these systems, it is becoming increasingly important that the design process take privacy issues into consideration. In a typical scenario, signals originate from many sensors capturing events involving the users, and several statistics of interest need to be continuously published in real-time. This paper considers the problem of providing differential privacy guarantees for such multiinput multi-output systems processing event streams. We show how to construct and optimize various extensions of the zero-forcing equalization mechanism, which we previously proposed for single-input single-output systems. Some of these extensions can take a model of the input signals into account. We illustrate our privacy-preserving filter design methodology through the problem of privately monitoring and forecasting occupancy in a building equipped with multiple motion detection sensors.
societal benefits, new tools are needed to provide clear privacy protection guarantees and allow users to balance utility with privacy rigorously [6] .
Since offering privacy guarantees for a system generally involves sacrificing some level of performance, evaluating the resulting trade-offs requires a quantitative definition of privacy.
Various such definitions have been proposed, such as disclosure risk [7] in statistics, k-anonymity [8] , information-theoretic privacy [9] , or conditions based on observability [10] , [11] . However, in the last few years the notion of differential privacy has emerged essentially as a standard specification [12] , [13] . Intuitively, a system processing privacy-sensitive inputs from individuals is differentially private if its published outputs are not too sensitive to the data provided by any single participant. This definition is naturally linked to the notion of system gain for dynamical systems, see [14] , [15] . One operational advantage of differential privacy compared to other definitions is that it provides strong guarantees without involving the difficult task of modeling all the available auxiliary information that could be linked to the published outputs, despite the fact that unanticipated privacy breaches are typically due to the presence of this side information [8] , [16] , [17] .
Differential privacy is a strong notion of privacy, but might require large perturbations to the published results of an analysis in order to hide individuals' data. This is especially true for applications where users continuously contribute data over time, and it is thus important to carefully design real-time mechanisms that can limit the impact on system performance of differential privacy requirements. Previous work on designing differentially private mechanisms for the publication of time series include [18] , [19] , but these mechanisms are not causal and hence not suited for real-time applications. The ZFE mechanism of Section IV could also be interpreted as a dynamic, causal version of the matrix mechanism introduced in [20] for static databases.
The papers [21] [22] [23] describe real-time differentially private mechanisms to approximate a few specific filters processing a stream of 0 − 1 variables, representing the occurence of events attributed to individuals. For example, [21] , [22] consider a private accumulator providing at each time the total number of events that occurred in the past. This paper is inspired by this scenario, and builds on our previous work on this problem in [14, Section IV] [15, Section VI]. Here we extend our analysis in particular to multi-input multi-output (MIMO) linear time-invariant systems, which considerably broadens the applicability of the model to more common situations where multiple sensors monitor an environment and we wish to concurrently publish several October 30, 2015 DRAFT statistics of interest. An application example is that of analyzing spatio-temporal records provided by networks of simple counting sensors, e.g., motion detectors in buildings or inductive-loop detectors in traffic information systems [24] . The literature on the differentially private processing of multi-dimensional time series is still very limited, but includes [25] , which considers a singleinput multiple-output filter where each output channel corresponds to a moving average filter with a different size for the averaging window, as well as [26] , which discusses an application to traffic monitoring.
To summarize, the contributions and organization of this paper are as follows. In Section II, we present a new generic scenario where we need to approximate a general MIMO linear time-invariant system by a mechanism offering differential privacy guarantees for the input signals. The formal definitions necessary to state the problem are also provided in that section.
In Section III we perform some preliminary system sensitivity calculations that are necessary in the rest of the paper. Section IV presents a general approximation scheme for MIMO systems that provides differential privacy guarantees for the input signals. The design methodology and performance of the privacy-preserving filter are illustrated in Section V in the context of a building occupancy estimation problem. Note that Sections III-V provide a more detailed presentation of the theoretical and simulation results contained in our conference paper [2] .
Finally, Section VI presents additional privacy-preserving mechanisms that can approximate the desired outputs more closely but require more information about the input signals to be publicly available, .e.g., their second-order statistics. It improves and extends to the MIMO case the results presented in our conference paper [1] . This section also illustrates the relationship between our problem and certain joint Transmitter-Receiver optimization problems arising in the communication systems literature [27] , [28] .
Notation: Throughout the paper we use the following standard abbreviations: LTI for Linear 
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT

A. Generic Scenario
We consider m sensors detecting events, with sensor i producing a discrete-time scalar signal
. In a building monitoring scenario for example, the sensors could be motion detectors distributed at various locations and polled at regular intervals, with u i,t ∈ N the number of detected events reported for period t. We denote u the resulting vector-valued signal,
i.e., u t ∈ R m . A linear time-invariant (LTI) filter F , with m inputs and p outputs, takes input signals u from the sensors and publishes output signals y = F u of interest, with y t ∈ R p . In our example, we might be interested in continuously updating real-time estimates of the number of people in various parts of the building, as well as short-and medium-term occupancy forecasts, in order to optimize the operations of the Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC)
system. The problem considered in this paper consists in replacing the filter F by a system processing the input u and producing a signalŷ as close as possible to the desired output y (minimizing for example the mean squared error lim T →∞
, while providing some privacy guarantees to the individuals from which the input signals u originate. The privacy constraint is explained and quantified in the next subsection.
B. Differential Privacy
As mentioned in the introduction, a differentially private mechanism publishes data in a way that is not too sensitive to the presence or absence of a single individual. A formal definition of differential privacy is provided in Definition 1 below. In the previous building monitoring example, one goal of a privacy constraint could be to provide guarantees that an individual cannot be tracked too precisely from the published (typically aggregate) data. Indeed, Wilson and Atkeson [29] for example demonstrate how to track individual users in a building using a network of simple binary sensors such as motion detectors.
1) Adjacency Relation: Formally, we start by defining a symmetric binary relation, denoted Adj, on the space D of datasets of interest, which captures what it means for two datasets to differ by the data of a single individual. Essentially, it is hard to determine from a differentially October 30, 2015 DRAFT private output which of any two adjacent input datasets was used. Here,
is the set of input signals, and we have Adj(u, u ) if and only if we can obtain the signal u from u by adding or subtracting the events corresponding to just one user. Motivated again by applications to spatial monitoring, we consider in this paper the following adjacency relation
parametrized by a vector k ∈ R m with components k i > 0. According to (1), a single individual can affect each input signal component at a single time (here δ t i denotes the discrete impulse signal with impulse at t i ), and by at most k i . Let e i ∈ R m be the i th basis vector, i.e., with coordinates e ij = δ ij , j = 1, . . . , m. Then for two adjacent signals u, u , we have with the notation in (1)
Note in passing that we can place additional constraints on k to capture additional knowledge about the problem, which can help design mechanisms with better performance, as we discuss later. For example, if we known that a given person can activate at most l < m sensor and each k i is 1, we can add the constraint |k| 1 ≤ l.
The adjacency relation (1) extends the one considered in [15] , [21] , [22] to the case of multiple input signals. It puts two constraints on the influence that an individual can have on the input data in order for a differentially private mechanism to offer him guarantees. First, any given sensor can report an event due to the presence of the individual only once over the time interval of interest for our analysis. This is a sensible constraint in applications such as traffic monitoring with fixed motion detectors activated only once by each car traveling along a road, certain location-based services where a customer would check-in say at most once per day at each visited store, or certain health-monitoring applications where an individual would report a sickness only once.
For a building monitoring scenario however, a single user could trigger the same motion detector several times over a relatively short period. A first solution consists in splitting the data stream of problematic sensors into several successive intervals, each considered as the signal from a new virtual sensor, so that an individual's data is present only once in each interval. A MIMO mechanism can then process such data and offer guarantees, addressing one of the main issues for the applicability of the model proposed in [21] , [22] . However, increasing the number of inputs degrades the privacy guarantees or the output quality that we can provide. Hence in general October 30, 2015 DRAFT no privacy guarantee will be offered to users who activate the same sensor too frequently. The second constraint imposed by (1) is that we bound the magnitude of an individual's contribution by k i , but this is not really problematic in applications such as motion detection, where we can typically take k i = 1.
2) Definition of Differential Privacy: Mechanisms that are differentially private necessarily randomize their outputs, in such a way that they satisfy the following property [12] , [13] , [30] .
Definition 1. Let D be a space equipped with a symmetric binary relation denoted Adj, and let
If δ = 0, the mechanism is said to be -differentially private.
This definition quantifies the allowed deviation for the output distribution of a differentially private mechanism for two adjacent datasets d and d . One can also show that it is impossible to design a statistical test with small error to decide if d or d was used by a differentially private mechanism to produce its output [31] , [32] . In this paper, the space D was defined as the space of input signals, and the adjacency relation considered is (1). The output space R is simply the space of output signals R := {y : N → R p }. Finally, a differentially private mechanism will consist of a system approximating our MIMO filter of interest F , as well as a source of noise necessary to randomize the outputs and satisfy (1) . We also refer the reader to [14] for a technical discussion on the (standard) σ-algebra M used on the output signal space to offer useful guarantees.
3) Sensitivity: Enforcing differential privacy can be done by randomly perturbing the published output of a system, at the price of reducing its utility or quality. Hence, we are interested in evaluating as precisely as possible the amount of noise necessary to make a mechanism differentially private. For this purpose, the following quantity plays an important role.
Definition 2. The 2 -sensitivity of a system G with m inputs and p outputs with respect to the adjacency relation Adj is defined by 
4) A Basic Differentially Private Mechanism:
The basic mechanism of Theorem 1 below (see [15] ), extending [30] , can be used to answer queries in a differentially private way. To present the result, we recall first the definition of the Q-function Q(x) :=
Theorem 1. Let G be a system with m inputs and p outputs, and with 2 -sensitivity ∆ m,p 2 G with respect to an adjacency relation Adj. Then the mechanism M (u) = Gu + w, where w is a pdimensional Gaussian white noise with covariance matrix κ
private with respect to Adj.
The mechanism M described in Theorem 1, which is a differentially-private version of a system G, is called an output-perturbation mechanism. We see that the amount of noise sufficient for differential privacy with this mechanism is proportional to the 2 -sensitivity of the filter and to κ δ, , which can be shown to behave roughly as O(ln(1/δ)) 1/2 / . Note that we add noise proportional to the sensitivity of the whole filter G independently on each output, even if G was diagonal say, otherwise trivial attacks that simply average a sufficient number of outputs could potentially detect the presence of an individual with high probability [15] .
In conclusion we could obtain a differentially private mechanism for our original problem by simply adding a sufficient amount of noise to the output of our desired filter F , provided we can compute its sensitivity, which is the topic of the next section. Moreover, it is possible in general to design mechanisms with much less overall noise than this output-perturbation scheme, as discussed in Sections IV and VI.
III. SENSITIVITY CALCULATIONS
For the following sensitivity calculations (see Definition 2), the H 2 norm of an LTI system plays an important role. We recall its definition for a system G with m inputs
for the p×m transfer matrix, we also note from the frequency domain
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A. Exact solutions for the SIMO and Diagonal Cases
Generalizing the SISO scenario considered in [14] , [15] to the case of a SIMO system, we have immediately the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (SIMO LTI system). Let G be a stable LTI system with one input and p outputs.
For the adjacency relation (1), we have ∆
Proof: We have immediately for u and u adjacent
and the bound is attained if
For a system G with multiple inputs, the special case where G is diagonal, i.e., its transfer
, also leads to a simple sensitivity result. Note that in this case, we have G
Theorem 3 (Diagonal LTI system). Let G be a stable diagonal LTI system with m inputs and outputs. For the adjacency relation (1), denoting
Proof: If G is diagonal, then for u and u' adjacent, we have from (2)
where g ii denotes the impulse response of G ii . Hence
and |α i | ≤ k i , for all i. Again the bound is attained if |α i | = k i for all i.
B. Upper and Lower Bound for the general MIMO Case
For MISO or general MIMO systems, the sensitivity calculations are no longer so straightforward, because the impulses on the various input channels, obtained from the difference of two adjacent signals u, u , all possibly influence any given output. Still, the following result provides simple bounds on the sensitivity.
October 30, 2015 DRAFT Theorem 4. Let G be a stable LTI system with m inputs and p outputs. For the adjacency
by definition. For the upper bound, we can write
, where the last inequality results from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
For the lower bound, let us first take u ≡ 0. Then consider an adjacent signal u with a single discrete impulse of height k i at time t i on each input channel i, for i = 1, . . . , m, with
Hence by taking t i+1 − t i large enough for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, i.e., waiting for the effect of impulse i on the output to be sufficiently small, we can choose the signal u such that
Since this is true for any η > 0 and Gδ
Note that if k 1 = . . . = k m , the upper bound on the sensitivity is
We can compare this bound to the situation where G is diagonal, in which case the sensitivity is exactly k 1 G 2 from Theorem 3. The following example shows that the upper bound of Theorem 4 cannot be improved for the general MISO or MIMO case.
response of G 1i , for some times τ 1 , . . . , τ m . Then G times t i such that τ i + t i is a constant, i.e., take 
C. Exact solution for the MIMO Case
For completeness, we give in this subsection an exact expression for the sensitivity of a MIMO filter. Let G be a stable LTI system with m inputs and p outputs, and state space representation
Recall the definition of the observability Gramian P 0 , which is the unique positive semi-definite solution of the equation
Let B i , D i be the i th column of the matrix B and D respectively, for i = 1, . . . , m. Finally, define for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, i = j, and τ in Z
Theorem 5. Let G be a stable LTI system with m inputs and p outputs, and state space representation (5). Then, for the adjacency relation (1), we have
Proof: In view of (2), we have
October 30, 2015 DRAFT For y i = Gδ t i e i and y = m i=1 α i y i , we have
where K = diag(k 1 , . . . , k m ) and the bound can be attained by taking
on the sign of S ij := ∞ t=0 y T i,t y j,t . Next, we derive the more explicit expression for S ij given in the theorem. First,
Then if t i = t j , we find that
which corresponds to the first case in (6). The case t i > t j is symmetric.
D. Discussion
In (7), the maximization over inter-event times t i − t j still needs to be performed and depends on the parameters of the specific system G. This result could be used to evaluate carefully the amount of noise necessary in an output perturbation mechanism, but unfortunately it seems too unwieldy at this point to be used in more advanced mechanism optimization schemes, such as the ones discussed in the next sections.
Still, the expression (7) provides some intuition about the way the system dynamics influence its sensitivity. In particular, the second term in (7) can give insight into the gap between the sensitivity and the lower bound in (4) . Note from the expression of S decrease the sensitivity of G is to increase sufficiently the required time |t i − t j | between the events contributed by a single user, in order for A |t i −t j | to be small enough. Hence, a lower bound on inter-event times in different streams could be introduced in the adjacency relation to reduce a system's sensitivity. This would weaken the differential privacy guarantee but help in the design of mechanisms with better performance. Another possibility would be to have a privacy-preserving mechanism simply ignore events from a given user as long as the lower bound on inter-event times is not reached.
IV. ZERO-FORCING MIMO MECHANISMS
Using the sensitivity calculations of Section III, we can now design differentially private mechanisms to approximate a given filter F , as discussed in Section II-A. The mechanisms described in this section generalize to the MIMO case some ideas introduced in [14] . The general approximation architecture considered is described on Fig. 1 . On this figure, the system H is of the form H = F L, with L a left inverse of the pre-filter G. We call the resulting mechanisms Zero-Forcing Equalization (ZFE) mechanisms. Our goal is to design G (and hence, H) so that the Mean Square Error (MSE) between y andŷ on Fig. 1 is minimized. In order to obtain a differentially private signal v, we introduce a Gaussian white noise signal w with variance proportional to the sensitivity of the filter G. It was shown in [14] for the SISO case that this setup can allow significant performance improvements compared to the output-perturbation mechanism. Note that the latter is recovered when G = F and H is the identity.
October 30, 2015 DRAFT
A. SIMO system approximation First, let us assume that F on Fig. 1 is a SIMO filter, with p outputs. Consider a first stage
. . , G q (z)) taking the input signal u and producing q intermediate outputs that must be perturbed. The second stage is taken to be
a left-inverse of G, i.e., satisfying
Let us also define the transfer functions
* , and thus in particular
and
From Theorem 2, the sensitivity of the first stage for input signals that are adjacent according
Hence, according to Theorem 1, adding a white Gaussian noise w to the output of G with covariance matrix k
I q is sufficient to ensure that the signal v on Fig. 1 is differentially private. The MSE for this mechanism can be expressed as
We are thus led to consider the minimization of F L 2 2 G 2 2 over the pre-filters G. We have
where in the last equality we used (8) . Now consider the following inner product on the space of 2π-periodic functions with values in C q f, g = 1 2π
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for this inner product applied to the functions ω → |F (e jω )| 2 M (e jω )
and ω → G(e jω ), we obtain the following bound
i.e., using (9),
Moreover, the two sides in the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality are equal, i.e., the bound is attained,
Note that this condition does not depend on q. Hence we can simply take q = 1, and
Finding G SISO satisfying (10) is a spectral factorization problem. We can choose G stable and minimum phase, so that its inverse L is also stable. The following theorem summarizes the preceding discussion and generalizes [15, Theorem 8] .
Theorem 6. Let F be a SIMO LTI system with F 2 < ∞. For any stable LTI system G,
If moreover F satisfies the Paley-Wiener condition
bound on the mean square error of the ZFE mechanism can be attained by some stable minimum phase SISO system G such that |G(e jω )| 2 = |F (e jω )| 2 , for almost every ω ∈ [−π, π).
Proof:
The main argument for the proof was given before the theorem. Since |F (e jω )| 2 is a nonnegative function on the unit circle, if it satisfies the Paley-Wiener condition, it has indeed a minimum phase spectral factor G satisfying (10) almost everywhere [33, p. 242 ].
(Suboptimal) ZFE mechanism for a MIMO system F u = m i=1 Fiui, and a diagonal pre-filter G(z) = diag(G11(z), . . . , Gmm(z)
B. MIMO system approximation
Let us now assume that F has m > 1 inputs. We write F (z) = [F 1 (z), . . . , F m (z)], with F i a p×1 transfer matrix. In this case, in view of the complicated expression (7) for the sensitivity of a general MIMO filter, we only provide a subpotimal ZFE mechanism, together with a comparison between the performance of our mechanism and the optimal ZFE mechanism. The idea is to restrict our attention to pre-filters G that are m × m and diagonal, for which the sensitivity is given in Theorem 3. The problem of optimizing the diagonal pre-filters, using the architecture depicted on Fig. 2 , can in fact be seen as designing m SIMO mechanisms. 
Following the same reasoning as in the previous subsection, the MSE for this mechanism can be expressed as
with
|G ii (e jω )| 2 dω.
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Hence from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality again, we obtain the lower bound
and this bound is attained if
In other words, the best diagonal pre-filter for the MIMO ZFE mechanism can be obtained from m spectral factorizations of the functions ω →
Theorem 7. Let F = [F 1 , . . . , F m ] be a MIMO LTI system with F 2 < ∞. We have, for any
If moreover each F i satisfies the Paley-Wiener condition
lower bound on the mean-squared error of the ZFE mechanism can be attained by some stable minimum phase systems
Remark 1. Note that the integrand on the right-hand side of (14) can be written
where K = diag(k 1 , . . . , k m ) as usual and · 2,1 is the so-called L 2,1 or R 1 matrix norm, and appears in [34] for example.
2) Comparison with Non-Diagonal Pre-filters: For F a general MIMO system, it is possible that we could achieve a better performance with a ZFE mechanism where G is not diagonal, i.e., by combining the inputs before adding the privacy-preserving noise. To provide a better understanding of how much could potentially be gained by carrying out this more involved optimization over general pre-filters G rather than just diagonal pre-filters, the following Theorem provides a a lower bound on the MSE achievable by any ZFE mechanism. 
where F (e jω )K * denotes the nuclear norm of the matrix F (e jω )K (sum of singular values).
The lower bound (15) on the achievable MSE with a general pre-filter in a ZFE mechanism should be compared to the performance (14) that can actually be achieved with diagonal prefilters. Note that these bounds coïncide for m = 1. For m > 1, the gap depends on the difference between the integrals of the L 2,1 norm and the nuclear norm of F (e jω )K.
Proof: We denote as usual K = diag(k 1 , . . . , k m ), and defineG 
and so e
where F (e jω )K * = Tr(A(e jω )) denotes the nuclear norm of the matrix F (e jω )K. The filename refers to the high-order bits of the timestamps on the data contained in each file.
The files contain data like this: The first element is the sensor identification number. The second and third numbers are the timestamps of the beginning of the event. The fourth number is a meaningless place holder value.
The map in Figure 3 dataset is interesting because it contains significant structures that exist across these visualizations. As people move through the building they create a spatio-temporal trace of motion activations. When they pass by or interact with other individuals their traces become tangled into a spatio-temporal graph of possibilities. In this section we show how the use of these graphs helps an operator quickly untangle these trace relationships and find all video-and sensor-based evidence relating to an individual occupant of the space.
Human-guided tracking
In this section we present the principles and challenges of information visualization used in the tracking module of our system. The technical background of track composition and analysis technique that we use here can be found in our earlier paper [6] . Due to the impoverished nature of the motion sensors, it is not possible to unambiguously track individuals through a building if they cross paths or otherwise interact with other individuals in the space. A massive crowd would generate an overwhelming mass of ambiguity, such as during a fire evacuation as depicted in Figure 10 . However, the much more common case is that each individual interacts with a few others to create webs of ambiguity, such as those represented by the graph in Figure 11 .
These graphs are constructed from nodes of ambiguity connected by unambiguous spatio-temporal traces called tracklets. The tracklets are depicted on the map as distinct lines tracing an unambiguous path through the space, as seen in Figure 13 . At any moment there may be multiple tracklets under consideration: a series of selected tracks and several possible future continuations. These tracklets are distinguished from one another in several ways. First, each tracklet is coded with a unique color. Second, as is apparent in Figure 13 , the tracklets are assigned spatially distinct channels on the map to reduce the possibility [35] . The shaded areas are hallways, lobbies and meeting rooms equipped with binary motion detection sensors, placed a few meters apart and recording events roughly every second. Right: a figure taken from [36] shows a visualisation of a crowd movement during a fire drill.
V. APPLICATION TO PRIVACY-PRESERVING ESTIMATION OF BUILDING OCCUPANCY
In this section we illustrate the design process and the performance of the ZFE mechanism in the context of an application to filtering and forecasting occupancy-related events in an office building equipped with motion detection sensors. As mentioned in Section II-B, such sensor networks raise privacy concerns since some occupants could potentially be tracked individually from the published information, especially when it is correlated with public information such as the location of their office. Since the amount of private information leakage depends on the output signals the system aims to generates, we adjust the privacy-preserving noise level based on the filter specification using the ZFE mechanism. As an example, we simulate the outputs of a 3 × 15 MIMO filter processing input signals collected during a sensor network experiment carried out at the Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratories (MERL) and described in [35] and on Fig. 3 . We refer the reader to [36] for examples of identification of individual trajectories from this dataset.
The original dataset contains the traces of 213 sensors placed a few meters apart and spread over two floors of a building, where each sensor recorded roughly every second and with millisecond accuracy over a year the exact times at which they detected some motion. For October 30, 2015 DRAFT illustration purposes we downsampled the dataset in space and time, summing all the events recorded by several sufficiently close sensors over 3 minute intervals. From this step, we obtained 15 input signals u i , i = 1, . . . , 15, corresponding to 15 spatial zones (each zone covered by cluster of about 14 sensors), with a discrete-time period corresponding to 3 minutes, and u i,t being the number of events detected by all the sensors in zone i during period t. Let us assume say that during a given discrete-time period, a single individual can activate at most 4 sensors in any group, hence k i = 4 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 15. Moreover, we need to assume that a single individual only activates the sensors in a given zone once over the time interval for which we wish to provide differential privacy. Section II-B discussed how to relax this requirement by splitting the input data into successive time windows and creating additional input channels.
For our example, we consider computing simultaneously and in real-time the following three outputs from the 15 input signals
where
• y 1 is the sum of the simple moving averages over the past 60 min for zones 1 to 5, i.e.,
• y 2 is 12 i=5 f 2 u i , with f 2 a finite impulse response low-pass filter with Gaussian shaped impulse response of length 20, obtained using Matlab's function gaussdesign(0.5,2,10).
• y 3 is the scalar output of a 1 × 15 MISO filter f 3 designed to forecast at each period t the average total number of events per time-period that will occur in the whole building during the window [t + 60 min, t + 90 min]. This filter was constructed by identifying an ARMAX model [37] between the 15 inputs (plus a scalar white noise) and the desired outputs, with the calibration done using one part of the dataset. The model chosen is takes the form
where a 1 , . . . , a 4 and b 0 , b 1 are scalar and row vectors respectively forming the filter f 3 , c 1 is a scalar and e t is a zero-mean white noise input postulated by the ARMAX model for system identification purposes. The 15 optimal pre-filters were obtained approximately via least-squares fit of |F i (e jω )| 2 with negligible approximation error (Matlab's function yulewalk implementing the Yule-Walker method [38] ), rather than true spectral factorization mentioned in Theorem 7. One apparent aspect of the privacy-preserving outputs seen on Fig. 4 is that the noise level is independent of the size of the desired output signal, hence low signal values tend to be easily buried in the noise. This is one drawback of mechanisms relying on global sensitivity measures and additive noise.
Another noticeable element is the fact that the noise remaining on each output can have quite different characteristics depending on the desired filter F , with the post-filter F G −1 removing more high-frequency components on the second output than on the third.
VI. EXPLOITING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE INPUT SIGNALS
The main issue with SISO zero-forcing equalizers is the noise amplification at frequencies where |G(e jω )| is small, due to the inversion in H = F G −1 [39] . This issue is not as problematic for the optimal ZFE mechanism, since in this case the amplification is compensated by the fact that |F (e jω )| and |G(e jω )| given in Theorem 7 are both small at the same frequencies.
Nonetheless, we expect to be able to improve on the ZFE mechanism by using more advanced equalization schemes in the design of H. In this section the choice of post-filter H of Fig. 1 depends on certain input signal properties, and we concentrate on the optimization of diagonal pre-filters G as for the ZFE mechanism. Note however that the mechanisms below require that the input signals satisfy certain constraints, such as wide-sense stationarity, and that some publicly available information on these signals be available, e.g., their second order statistics. Hence, the ZFE mechanism remains generally useful due to its broad applicability.
A. Exploiting Information on Second-Order Statistics with Linear Mean Square Mechanisms
First, one can improve on the ZFE mechanism if some information on the statistics of the input signal u is publicly available. In general, constructing the optimum maximum-likelihood Fig. 1 is computationally intensive and requires the knowledge of the full joint probability distribution of {u k } k≥0 [39] . Hence, we explore in this subsection a simpler scheme based on linear minimum mean square error estimation, which we call the Linear Mean Square (LMS) mechanism.
To develop the LMS mechanism, we assume that it is publicly known that u is wide-sense stationary (WSS) with know mean vector µ and matrix-valued autocorrelation sequence
Since the mean of the output y is then known, equal to F (1)µ, we can assume without loss of generality that µ = 0. The z-spectrum of u, P u (z) =
assumed for simplicity of exposition to be rational and positive definite on the unit circle, i.e., for z = e jω . More generally, given two vector-valued WSS zero-mean signals u and v, we denote the
and all z-spectra are assumed to be rational.
The design of the LMS mechanism relies on a Wiener filter H to estimate y from v on Fig. 1 [33], [40] . Recall that the Wiener filter produces an estimateŷ minimizing the MSE between y andŷ over linear filters, assuming that the signal v is stationary. Its design requires the knowledge of the second-order statistics of v, which can be expressed in terms of those of u, w, and of the transfer function G. can take the privacy-preserving noise w to be white and Gaussian with covariance σ 2 I m with
. Since u and w are uncorrelated, we have
Hence
The MSE can then be expressed as e lms (G) =
Tr(P y (e jω ) − Pŷ(e jω ))dω [40, Chapter 7] . In our case,
where on the second line and below we omit the argument e jω next to all matrices, to simplify the notation. We have then
with the last expression obtained using the matrix inversion lemma. Finally, definingG(e jω ) := 1 GK 2 G(e jω )K, we obtain the expression
The objective (19) should be minimized over all transfer functionsG, which by definition must satisfy the constraint
Note that in (19) we recover the expression (12) of the performance of the ZFE mechanism in the limitP u (e jω ) → ∞.
It remains to minimize the performance measure (19) over the choise of pre-filters G satisfying (20) . First, in the case whereP u (e jω ) or equivalently P u (e jω ) is diagonal for all ω, i.e., the different input signals are uncorrelated, we have in fact a classical allocation problem [41] whose solution is of the "waterfilling type". Namely, denoteP u (e jω ) = diag(p 1 (e jω ), . . . , p m (e jω )) and
, with x i (e jω ) = |g ii (e jω )| 2 . Omitting the expression e jω in the integrals for clarity, (19) and (20) read
and the solution to this convex problem is
where λ > 0 is adjusted so that the solution satisfies the equality constraint (20) . Problems of this type are discussed in the communication literature on joint transmitter-receiver optimization [27] , [28] , which is not too surprising in view of our approximation setup on Fig. 1 .
is not diagonal, it is shown in [28] that the problem can be reduced to the diagonal case ifG can be arbitrary, however the argument does not carry through under our constraint thatG must also be diagonal. Nonetheless, one can obtain a solution arbitrarily close to the optimal one using semidefinite programming. First, we discretize the optimization problem at the set of frequencies ω q = qπ N , q = 0 . . . N . Note that all functions are even functions of ω, hence we can restrict out attention to the interval [0, π]. Then, we define the m(N + 1) variables
, with x iq ≥ 0, and X q = diag(x 1q , . . . , x mq ). Using the trapezoidal rule to approximate the integrals, we obtain the following optimization problem
s.t. Remark 2. Even if the statistical assumptions on u turn out not to be correct, and even though the optimization problem is solved approximately rather than exactly, the differential privacy guarantee of the LMS mechanism still holds and only the approximation quality is impacted.
2) Causal Mechanism: Once the diagonal pre-filter G is computed by the optimization procedure described above, we construct the final mechanism by replacing the smoother H from (18) by a filter respecting the causality or delay constraints of the application. Note from (17) that P v (e jω ) 0 for all −π ≤ ω < π. Denote the canonical spectral factorization 
B. Exploiting Information on the Input Domain using Decision-Feedback Mechanisms
Signals capturing event streams often take values in a discrete set, e.g., if they originate from various counting sensors as in Section V. This information can be taken into account together with the previous statistical information by introducing a slight degree of nonlinearity in the LMS mechanism, using the idea of decision-feedback equalization [39] . We call the resulting mechanism presented below a Decision-Feedback (DF) mechanism. Its architecture is depicted on Fig. 5 . Note that compared to the optimal Wiener smoother (18) in the previous section, which is of the form F H u , the only structural difference is the presence of the decision block and the feedback loop.
The first stage of the DF mechanism is a pre-filter whose sensitivity determines as usual the amount of privacy-preserving noise w to add. The second stage consists of a forward filter H 1 , a nonlinear decision procedure (detector or quantizer) to estimate u fromũ, which exploits the fact that u takes discrete values, and a filter H 2 that feeds back the previous symbol decisions to correct the intermediate estimateũ. H 2 is assumed to be strictly causal, but H 1 is often taken to be at least slightly non-causal in standard DF equalizers, for better performance [42] . In this case the mechanism will introduce a small delay in the publication of the output signalŷ. In the absence of detailed information about the distribution of u, the decision device can be a simple quantizer for integer valued input sequences, or a detectorû k = sign(ũ k ) for input sequences taking values in {−1, +1}.
The error between the desired output F u and the signal Fũ, whereũ is the input of the detector, is e = F (u −ũ) = F (u − H 1 v + H 2û ). For tractability reasons, the analysis and design of DF equalizers is usually carried out under the simplifying assumption that the past decisions entering H 2 are correct, i.e., thatû k = u k . In this case, the error reads e ≈ F ((B − H 1 G)u − H 1 w),
with B(z) = I + H 2 (z) a monic filter (i.e., B 0 = I) since H 2 is strictly causal. For a given B, the system H 1 minimizing the MSE is again the Wiener smoother to estimate Bu from Gu + w, Note that SBQ is a monic, stable and causal filter. We have the following lemma. since the terms in the last sum are positive semi-definite matrices. Clearly equality is attained for G k = 0 for k ≥ 1.
From Lemma 1 we deduce immediately that we should choose B(z) = S −1 (z)Q −1 (z) and the corresponding MSE is e df (G) = κ 2 δ, Tr(T R), with the positive definite matrices T, R defined in (23) , (24) .
The final step would be to optimize the filter G to minimize this expression of e df . Although this can be done using an approach similar to the one of the Section VI-A, see [1] , [43] , it appears that this procedure in general results in a pre-filter G that does not depend on the query F , which could be an artifact of the initial assumption that past decisions are correct. This can be seen most easily in the single-input case where T, R are positive scalars, so that e df (G) = T R. In this product F influences only in the factor T and G only in the factor R, hence the minimization over G does not depend on F . Optimizing G independently of F appears to lead to suboptimal designs in general, see [1] .
Hence, we propose the following design strategy for DF mechanisms. Note from (18) that the (non-causal) LMS mechanism involves a Wiener smoother H(z) = F (z)H u (z), with H u the Linear Minimum Mean Squared Error estimator for u. We can interpret the DF mechanism on Fig. 5 as introducing an additional (nonlinear) stage to the LMS mechanisms to discretize the estimate of u, and replacing H u by H 1 . A (potentially suboptimal) strategy to improve on the performance of the LMS (or ZFE) mechanism is then to keep the same prefilter G designed in Section VI-A, but simply replace the Wiener smoother or filter by the decision-feedback equalizer as described above, with a causal or almost causal approximation of the filter H 1 . Our simulation results tend to confirm that good performance is achievable with this strategy.
Remark 1. Other DF mechanisms are possible. For example, H 1 could be chosen as a zeroforcing (H 1 = G −1 in the SISO case) rather than a mean square equalizer, see, e.g., [44] .
VII. CONCLUSION
We have described a two-stage optimization procedure that can be used in the filtering of event streams in order to minimize the impact on performance of a differential privacy specification.
The architecture considered here for the privacy-preserving mechanisms decomposes into a October 30, 2015 DRAFT standard equalization or estimation problem, for which many alternatives techniques could be used depending on the scenario, and a first-stage privacy-preserving filter optimization problem.
This two-stage design allows us to balance the privacy constraint and performance, and appears to be in fact quite general and even applicable to other definitions of privacy. Current work includes extending it to the design of differentially private nonlinear filters [45] .
